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NINETEENTH-CENTURY-PRINCIPLES FOR TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY PLEADING†
ABSTRACT
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, upended the standards of pleading under the Federal Rules.
In both cases, the plaintiffs had filed complaints so unsubstantiated that the
Court concluded they could have no other purpose than to abuse the discovery
process against the defendants. Rather than subject the defendants to these
unfair burdens, the Court struck language from a fifty-year-old precedent,
Conley v. Gibson, that would have allowed the suits to proceed.
The Court’s solution created three new problems. Lower court judges
found little guidance in its new, amorphous “plausibility” standard. Critics
argued that Twombly and Iqbal would lock the gates to the federal courts.
Even the decisions’ supporters bristled at the Court’s cavalier treatment of
precedent.
This Comment solves all three of these problems. It reaches back to the
writings of David Dudley Field, the great nineteenth-century legal reformer,
from whose work Judge Charles E. Clark derived the Federal Rules.
Consulting these two giants of civil procedure reveals Twombly and Iqbal to
be consistent with the commonsense principles that Field first articulated in
1847 and Clark reaffirmed in 1938. For judges interpreting Twombly and
Iqbal, this Comment fills in those cases’ gaps to propose a model of decision
that unites traditional principles with the Court’s new jurisprudence. For the
critics, this Comment shows how tradition mandates a narrow reading of
Twombly and Iqbal, allowing judges to dismiss complaints only when those
complaints present the same dilemma that prompted the Court to intervene.
For the supporters, this Comment shows how Twombly and Iqbal better reflect
the original meaning of the Federal Rules than the caselaw the Court
discarded, so that they no longer need choose between keeping faith with
tradition and defending sensible pleading standards.

†

This Comment received the 2010 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.
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Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius,
That you would have me seek into myself
For that which is not in me?
—WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2

INTRODUCTION
Pleading precedes jurisdiction, and so crisis in pleading threatens crisis for
all the law. According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”1 This crisis came about as plaintiffs began to exploit a
decades-old precedent, which had interpreted this language before the advent
of modern complex litigation. Conley v. Gibson,2 articulating a standard that
would come to be synonymous with the phrase “notice pleading,” instructed
that a complaint would survive a motion to dismiss3 unless the plaintiff could
prove “no set of facts” that would entitle him to relief.4 So, said the plaintiffs
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, we could sue all the major
telecommunications companies in America for conspiracy in restraint of trade,
subjecting them to millions of dollars in discovery costs, without first alleging
any evidence that such a conspiracy had taken place.5 So, said the plaintiff in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, I could sue the Attorney General of the United States for
discrimination, gaining access to sensitive documents about national security
policy, without first alleging any evidence that he had acted on any racial or
religious bias.6 If the Court had followed this precedent, all Americans would
have borne the burdens: as consumers of the telecommunications companies,
to whom the companies would pass those costs; and as citizens of the
government, whose leaders would have no choice but to divide their time
between their duties and their legal defense. Instead, the Court decided that
Conley’s no set of facts standard afforded defendants too little protection from
opportunistic plaintiffs, from whom federal courts would require “plausible”
claims for relief before allowing their cases to proceed to discovery.7
1

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing defendants to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted”).
4 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45.
5 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
6 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
7 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
2
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The solution to this crisis created another, because in its rush to do justice
to the parties before it, the Court seemed to have disregarded the understanding
of federal pleading as developed over the prior fifty years. In dissent, Justice
Stevens excoriated the majority for discarding the bulk of its pleading
jurisprudence under the Federal Rules.8 Beginning immediately after the
announcement of the Twombly decision, critics echoed Justice Stevens in
decrying the majority’s choice to overthrow the “70-year-old regime of notice
pleading” and its bad faith in doing so.9 The majority’s scanty list of
authorities supporting its assertion that the no set of facts standard had “been
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough”10 played into this
charge. The Court’s confusing disposition of the case embarrassed even
commentators who agreed with its result, such as Professor Richard Epstein,
who described Twombly motions to dismiss as “(disguised) summary
judgments.”11 In addition, Twombly replaced the straightforward no set of
facts standard with a new “plausibility” test so nebulous that in Iqbal, the
original Twombly majority could not agree on how to apply it to the Iqbal
complaint.12 This left lower court judges with the task of figuring out how
Twombly-Iqbal pleading should work in other areas of law.
If the Conley Court’s 1957 understanding of Federal Rules pleading under
Rule 8 was correct, then Justice Stevens and the chorus of naysayers have
Twombly right. Twombly would exemplify “judicial activism,” the practice of
judges making up law as it suits them rather than adhering to a consistent
methodology for deciding cases. Twombly’s sins would be all the more
egregious because among the members of that majority are some of the
harshest critics of judicial law making.13
This Comment argues that the Federal Rules embody principles dating
back to David Dudley Field’s original pleading reforms of 1848, which Judge
Clark updated rather than reinvented when he drafted the Rules on pleading. It
8

Id. at 544, 577–78 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing numerous authorities).
See, e.g., Michael Dorf, The End of Notice Pleading?, DORF ON LAW (May 24, 2007, 7:35 AM),
http://www.michaeldorf.org/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (describing a “rough consensus coalescing
among proceduralists” that the Twombly Court’s treatment of precedent is “simply false”).
10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (majority opinion).
11 Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary
Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 61–62 (2007).
12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (Justices Souter and
Breyer, who were among the Twombly majority, disagreeing with the other five members of the Twombly
majority on the application of its holding).
13 See generally, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking the
majority’s activism); id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same).
9
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unfolds across three parts. Part I begins by relating the problems that
prompted Field’s reforms. It explains Field’s principles of pleading and how
the courts of the time misapplied them. It shows how Judge Clark refined
Field’s work into Rules pleading only to have Conley misconstrue that as well.
Part II argues that Twombly and Iqbal mark a return to the original meaning of
the Rules. It organizes them into two principles of pleading, which this
Comment calls the “notice-gap principle” and the “deference principle.” Part
III develops these principles of pleading into a model that judges and litigators
can use to structure their analysis of pleading problems.
I. COMMENTARIES ON THE CODIFICATION WARS
Twombly’s roots in the nineteenth-century pleading reform movement both
explain its textual legitimacy and direct its interpretation for future cases. The
pleading reform movement arose because the then-prevailing pleading
standards wasted litigants’ time and resources on matters unrelated to their
cases’ merits. The reformers, led by David Dudley Field, undertook to
repurpose pleading from a ritual exercise driven by technicalities into a tool to
focus cases on the real matters in dispute. Although the problem Field set out
to solve differs in its particulars from the one that the Twombly Court
attempted to fix, the same principle of “fair notice” connects these two
generations of reformers.
The history of pleading is divided into three parts. Until the nineteenth
century, pleading developed as a common law discipline. As the law had
evolved, pleading rules persisted from times when courts had entertained fewer
types of disputes. These rules had served to restrain courts from exceeding
their limited jurisdiction, but when changes in the substantive law expanded
the courts’ role in civic life, the antiquated, obsolete pleading rules remained.14
David Dudley Field wrote and helped enact a code of civil procedure to restore
procedural fairness to the litigation process, structuring pleadings around the
concept of fair notice. Judges, however, resisted these reforms. They overlaid
a doctrine of technicalities onto the process. These dubious judicial inventions
came to define the era of “Code pleading.”15 A new generation of reformers
took on this problem in the twentieth century. Led by Judge Clark, they chose
to reassert Field’s principle of fair notice through judicial rules rather than
statutes. This ushered in the third era, Federal Rules pleading. The Rules
14
15

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
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brought pleading practice closer to Field’s ideal than ever before, but once
again, judges refused to apply the principle of fair notice as codified, resulting
in the Conley decision and the muddled caselaw following it.16
Proper Twombly-Iqbal jurisprudence requires study of this history because
it provides the answers to questions that fell outside the scope of the Court’s
review in those cases. Though on its face Twombly may appear vague and
incomplete, this is because the decision reaffirms a longstanding doctrine of
fair notice rather than invents a new one.17 Where the Court’s precedents do
not provide a certain answer to a Twombly-Iqbal question, judges can use these
historical sources to discern Rule 8’s original meaning and decide cases
accordingly.
A. Pleading at Common Law
The term “pleading,” though archaic in describing contemporary judges’
permissive attitude in granting access to courts, captures the fraught process
through which litigants attempted to vindicate their claims in the common law
era by “pleading” for help. “Pleading” has survived with its tinge of feudal
supplication intact, recalling that time of limited judicial intervention. As the
scope of rights under the substantive law expanded, though, judges did not
loosen procedural rules to accommodate them. Instead, they insisted on
applying those rules woodenly, often inflicting waste and delay on meritorious
litigants.18
The common law model of pleading came from a time when courts had
narrower jurisdiction, structuring cases around the then-crucial determination
of whether the court had the power to issue judgment for the plaintiff. Causes
of action, then known as “forms of action,”19 comprise, in a sense, courts’
enumerated powers.20 At common law, plaintiffs invoked these powers
through “writs,” which corresponded to the available forms of action.21 When
16

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Parts I.B, I.C.1, II.A.
18 See generally RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the historical
development of pleading practice).
19 Id.
20 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (limiting the power of the Legislative Branch by individually listing each of
Congress’s powers). Just as enumeration of powers checks Congress by confining its legislation to a few key
subjects, causes of action check the courts by permitting intervention only in a few particular kinds of disputes.
See id. art. III, § 2 (limiting the power of the Judicial Branch by individually listing the “cases” and
“controversies” over which the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction).
21 FREER, supra note 18, § 7.2.
17
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a plaintiff could not articulate his dispute as a form of action, the court had no
jurisdiction over the parties, and the plea would go unanswered.22 Unlike
present practice, common law pleading involved successive rounds of pleading
that continued back and forth until the parties fully developed the questions of
fact and law for the court.23 Because early legal systems arose as alternatives
to vengeance, they entertained only controversies involving intentional harms
that would otherwise have led to feuds.24 Over time, courts began to recognize
new forms of liability and created new forms of action so that plaintiffs could
reach them.25
This jurisdiction-oriented, pleadings-driven style of litigation became
obsolete when the forms of action began to encroach on one another until no
jurisdictional gaps remained, because cases were still revolving around
jurisdiction even as jurisdiction was becoming substantively trivial. Cases
arose in which judges might have no doubt about their jurisdiction over a
dispute or whether the defendant was liable to the plaintiff, but nonetheless
agonized over whether the plaintiff had sued using the appropriate writ.26 An
unlucky plaintiff might have found, as his case developed, that the facts
established his right to relief on some form of action other than his writ’s.
Though the plaintiff would have won the case had he chosen the correct writ,
this variance would compel the court to grant judgment to the defendant.27
The vehemence that this nonsensical practice inspired in its contemporaries has
persisted to this day.28

22 See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, WHAT SHALL BE DONE WITH THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS? (Jan. 1,
1847), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226,
233 (A. P. Sprague ed., 1884) (“In the earliest periods of our law, every cause was commenced by an original
writ, . . . which gave jurisdiction of the cause to those Courts . . . .”).
23 CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 4 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter
CLARK, CODE PLEADING]; FREER, supra note 18, § 7.2.
24 O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2–3 (1881).
25 See id. at 3–38 (tracing the development of liability).
26 E.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 294–95 (1850) (distinguishing between the question
whether “any action will lie,” i.e., whether the plaintiff can obtain any remedy at all, and “the long-vexed
question, under the rule of the common law, whether a party’s remedy, where he has one, should be sought in
an action of the case, or of trespass,” i.e., whether the plaintiff sued on the appropriate writ); see also FREER,
supra note 18, § 7.2 (describing the difference between trespass and case).
27 See FIELD, supra note 22, at 237 (“A mistake in the form of the action is generally fatal to the case.”).
28 Compare id. at 232 (“Why should it be necessary to go through with this troublesome, dilatory, and
expensive process, simply to ask one’s adversary a question?”), with FREER, supra note 18, § 7.2 (describing
common law pleading as “arcane” and “excruciating,” as leading to decisions “based upon technicalities”
rather than “merits,” as “elevat[ing] form over substance,” and as “hinder[ing] the administration of justice”).
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B. Pleading Under the Field Code
The courts did not correct this problem on their own initiative, and so
lawmakers attempted to impose a solution. David Dudley Field drafted it, and
it became known as the “Field Code.”29 Instead of forcing the plaintiff to
plead “issues,” the Code only tasked the plaintiff with providing notice to the
defendant of his legal claim and its factual background by pleading “facts.”30
Field intended this process to replace the common law’s technicalities with a
flexible notice requirement. However, judges trained in and used to the
common law created a new set of technicalities called the “ultimate facts”
doctrine. They prohibited not only complaints that provided too little notice to
the defendant but also those that provided too much.31 The original meaning
of the Field Code, as understood both by its drafters and by the next generation
of procedural reformers, never prevailed in practice, leaving its fruition to
future generations of reformers—ultimately, the Twombly Court.
The Field Code organized pleadings around the concept of the story of the
case. Field wrote, “[T]here can not be any good reason why the story should
not be told in the ordinary language of life, in the only language intelligible to
the juries who are to decide the causes.”32 The plaintiff would “set forth his
cause of action in his complaint briefly, in ordinary language, and without
repetition.”33 Field envisioned pleadings that would allow “any plain man,
hearing the parties’ own statements [to] get a better understanding, in half an
hour, of the points in dispute between them, than the most astute lawyer can
get from our modern records.”34 His Code reduced pleadings to a complaint
and answer containing the “real charge” and “real defense,” permitted
amendment of pleadings for cases in progress, and severed discovery from
pleading.35

29 Charles E. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS
55, 56 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949) [hereinafter Clark, Pleading and Practice] (“While the Commission which
recommended the code was composed of three persons . . . it is well known that the other commissioners
allowed [Field] free scope to put into effect the original ideas he had been advocating . . . .”).
30 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 7 (contrasting Code “fact pleading” against common law
“issue pleading”).
31 FREER, supra note 18, § 7.3.2.
32 FIELD, supra note 22, at 239.
33 Id. at 240.
34 Id. at 244.
35 Id. at 240–42.
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These reforms aimed “to do justice, with the least possible delay and
expense.”36 As such, this form of pleading also allowed for the practice of
verification by oath, which Field regarded as “desirable, both as a means of
preventing to a considerable extent groundless suits and groundless defenses,
and of compelling the parties respectively to admit the undisputed facts.”37
“Suppose it were certain that a cause would be better decided if the parties
were allowed five years to get their proofs, and the Court five years to decide:
who would think of allowing any such thing? The expensiveness of lawsuits is
also a consideration of immense consequence.”38 From this followed his
insight that “[d]ear justice is no justice to the largest class of litigants.”39
The Field Code yielded some progress but ultimately disappointed the next
generation of reformers, who would write the Federal Rules. The same sort of
judges whose caprice had provoked the codification movement insisted on
reading the Field Code obtusely.40 One onlooker, Wisconsin’s then-Chief
Justice Winslow, marveled at “the cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which
the infant Code received from the New York judges.”41
The principal problem in the Code came from language to the effect that
pleadings should contain “facts” rather than “law” or “evidence,” all terms of
art in Code pleading. Judges took the vague distinction between these three
categories as a license to reintroduce complications into Code pleading.
Lawyers and judges in practice tended to “overemphasize ‘facts’ as uniquely
different from either law or evidence.”42 In doing so, these judges perverted
Field’s fact pleading into a doctrine of “ultimate facts,” as distinguished from
“conclusions of law” (facts alleged too generally) and “evidentiary facts” (facts

36
37
38

Id. at 243.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 247. A few years later, a British former law clerk denounced
[a] suit before the Court [of Chancery] which was commenced nearly twenty years ago; in which
from thirty to forty counsel have been known to appear at one time; in which costs have been
incurred to the amount of seventy thousand pounds; which is a friendly suit; and which is (I am
assured) no nearer to its termination now than when it was begun.

CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 5–6 (Barnes & Noble Classics ed. 2005) (1853).
39 FIELD, supra note 22, at 247.
40 See FREER, supra note 18, § 7.3.2 (“[M]any of the judges weaned on the technicalities of the common
law system could not help but import silly subtleties into the new system.”).
41 Clark, Pleading and Practice, supra note 29, at 58 (quoting McArthur v. Moffet, 128 N.W. 445, 446
(Wis. 1910)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Id.
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alleged too specifically).43 Because “facts do not easily disentangle themselves
from conclusions or from details,”44 a man of common understanding trying to
communicate his story in ordinary and concise language could stumble over a
conclusion of law or evidentiary fact. This would doom his case. A layman
could hardly expect to navigate between this Scylla and Charybdis without the
assistance of counsel.
The ultimate facts doctrine eclipsed the fair notice inquiry, which Field
intended as the real test of a pleading’s adequacy under the Code. Contrary to
Field’s ideal of pleadings as “plain, short statement[s] by each party”45 and his
admonition that under the Code “[w]e shall avoid the risk of losing causes
from mistaking the rules of pleading,”46 courts discarded complaints that put
the defendants on notice when those complaints failed to use the courts’
preferred formulations of fact.47 Though he criticized complaints that were “so
general as to convey no idea of the plaintiff’s demand,” he only attacked
needlessly specific complaints to the extent that they were “redundant with
words multiplied on words.”48 He placed no totemic significance on the
pleading of “facts” as such, asking instead for the plaintiff to plead “the nature
and particulars of the cause of suit,”49 providing further that “[t]he [c]ourt shall
have power at any time, in its discretion, to amend any . . . pleading . . . in
furtherance of justice.”50
For Field, pleadings served only two purposes. They facilitated trial
preparation by apprising each party of the other’s case and directing them
toward the evidence that would settle it, and they facilitated trial itself by
identifying the issues for the judge and jury to resolve the case.51 These goals
43 FREER, supra note 18, § 7.3.2. For example, a plaintiff might try to allege that he has superior title by
claiming that he “has superior title to the property” or is “entitled to the property,” both of which the New
York Court of Appeals regarded as impermissibly general. Id. (quoting Sheridan v. Jackson, 72 N.Y. 170, 173
(1878)). Allegations that a plaintiff “paid for property pursuant to contract” and that a defendant “delivered to
her a deed to the property,” though, were regarded as impermissibly specific by the California Supreme Court.
Id. (paraphrasing McCaughey v. Shuette, 46 P. 666 (Cal. 1896)).
44 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38.
45 FIELD, supra note 22, at 230.
46 Id. at 248.
47 For some examples of Code courts applying pleading rules arbitrarily, see the sources cited supra note
43.
48 FIELD, supra note 22, at 236; see also CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38 (“Rarely should a
pleading be condemned for being overspecific; and then the objection should be considered one of form
merely—undue verbosity, repetition, etc.—rather than one of substance.”).
49 FIELD, supra note 22, at 258.
50 Id. at 259.
51 Id. at 243–44.
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animate this Comment’s proposed principles of pleading.52 Judges in Field’s
time lost sight of these goals, just as the Conley Court would under the Federal
Rules.
C. Pleading Under the Federal Rules
This Comment now arrives at the current era, in which the Federal Rules
replaced the Field Code at the vanguard of civil procedure, and shows how the
Conley Court’s misinterpretation of the Rules created the crisis that the Twombly
and Iqbal Courts would later solve. This discussion splits into two parts to
delineate the two major theories of pleading under the Rules. The first part lays
out the original meaning of the Federal Rules. It embraced “fair notice” as the
pleading model, as Judge Clark explained in his writings. The second part
describes how the Conley Court reaffirmed fair notice as a principle of pleading
but also introduced a new, yet-more-permissive standard of pleading that seemed
to allow the plaintiff to provide less-than-fair notice.
1. Fair Notice—Rule 8’s Original Meaning

Judge Clark, in drafting Rule 8, made Field’s concept of fair notice the
pleading standard in federal court. He lifted the Rule’s operative language, “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,”53 directly from Field, who had written that a complaint under his Code
would require “a plain, short statement by each party, of his own case.”54 He
described Field’s fact pleading as a “main and guiding characteristic[] of
fundamental importance,”55 and portrayed his own project as a reassertion of
this “great code principle[] and a reformulation of [it] in the light of modern
experience to achieve more directly the results which Field had so thoroughly
visualized.”56
Clark modernized Field by working with the courts rather than against
them, switching from a code of pleading imposed on the courts by statute to a
“code” adopted by the courts as a set of judicial rules. Clark described his
project as “chang[ing] the source of our code, not its underlying nature, to
substitute for the legislature a body which is both more expert in the subject

52
53
54
55
56

See infra Part III.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
FIELD, supra note 22, at 230 (emphasis added).
Clark, Pleading and Practice, supra note 29, at 57.
Id. at 58.
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matter and more responsive to appropriate demands for change.”57 The Rules’
relative success vindicates Justice Holmes’s aphorism that “[t]he life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience.”58 The experience of the Field
Code demonstrated that judges could thwart efforts to take control of civil
procedure from them by interpreting the Code as a broad charter over which
they were free to develop a new “common law” of pleading.59 The Rules
solved this problem by conveying ownership of civil procedure back to the
judges.60 Although the Rules’ language did not deviate from what Field
suggested in 1847, the Justices of the Supreme Court had little reason to sap
the Rules by decisional law when they could amend them through a
straightforward legislative process.
Compared to Clark’s institutional innovations, the Rules’ drafting changes
were minor, designed principally to ensure that judges could not import the
“ultimate facts” caselaw that had bedeviled the Code era into the new Federal
Rules jurisprudence. By generically inviting the claimant to show that he “is
entitled to relief” rather than mandating that he plead “facts,” Clark allowed
courts to avoid the problem of determining what a “fact” is.61
According to Clark, the Rules rejected “notice pleading,” opting instead for
Field’s fair notice standard. “Notice pleading,” a confusing term because it
resembles “fair notice,” refers to a practice whereby the plaintiff merely
informs the defendant of the charge against him without substantiating the
complaint with any factual background.62 Clark wrote that “[t]he prevailing
idea at the present time [1947] is that notice should be given of all the
operative facts going to make up the plaintiff’s cause of action, except, of
course, those which are presumed or may properly come from the other
side.”63
57

Id.
HOLMES, supra note 24, at 1.
59 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997) (“[M]any believe that [the Constitution] is in effect a charter for judges to develop an evolving common
law . . . .”).
60 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (granting the Supreme Court final approval of the Rules); cf. Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing how the institution of property
encourages conscientious use by the propertied).
61 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38.
62 Clark avoided using the term “notice” in the Rules to avert this confusion. See Charles E. Clark,
Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 49–50 (1957) [hereinafter Clark, Special Pleading]
(“‘[N]otice’ is not a concept of the Rules . . . .”).
63 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38.
58
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Clark used the Forms to show the amount of detail Rules pleading required.
The Forms are “probably the most important part of the rules so far as this
particular topic [i.e., pleading detail] is concerned, . . . because when you can’t
define you can at least draw pictures to show your meaning.”64 The old Form
965 illustrated the difference between notice pleading and the fact pleading
contemplated by the Federal Rules:
Even under the simplified federal practice, the form for personal
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle, Federal Form 9, is not merely a
claim for money damages for defendant’s “negligence,” but it
differentiates the accident from all others by showing that it occurred
between a pedestrian and an autoist at a certain time and place, thus
making decision as to the proper method of trial or of appeal not
66
difficult, and the application of the doctrine of res judicata clear.

This quotation illuminates two important aspects of Rule 8. First, it shows that
Field’s concept of the claimant telling the story of his case, with just enough
factual detail to explain the “nature and particulars” of the suit, survived the
transition from the Code to the Rules. Second, instead of allowing the plaintiff
to make a bare allegation of negligence, the Rules represent a policy of
avoiding “needless delay and expense” by placing some of that burden on the
plaintiff at pleading.67
The Rules anticipate a notice requirement that scales as appropriate to the
particular claim,68 as demonstrated by Forms that require even more specifics.
Form 17, which provides a model complaint for specific performance of a
contract, requires the complainant not only to summarize the contents of the

64 Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that
these rules contemplate.”).
65 The Rules Committee has revised the old Form 9 into a version bereft of local color, FED. R. CIV. P.
Form 11 (2007), presumably to clarify that the Rules would also apply to an accident a block over on Hall or
McBride.
66 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38.
67 In a manner recalling the common law that the Code and the Rules had displaced, Judge Clark
recognized that whereas “[g]eneral fact pleading is useful; special pleading of details, carried to the extreme”
(as in New York’s prior Code practice) would lead to “pleading altercations . . . [that] go on and on as long as
the judicial patience permits.” Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 62, at 47, 52. Judge Clark endorsed a note
by the Rules Committee explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) “requires the pleader to disclose adequate information as
the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it.”
Id. at 47, 54.
68 See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38 (explaining that what constitutes a “fact” for the
purposes of fact pleading depends on the cause of action); infra Part III.A.1.
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contract but also to attach the contract itself.69 This obligation cannot be
reconciled with the idea of stating claims in general terms and substantiating
them only during discovery.
Other features of the Rules that bear on pleading, including the rules of
construction, heightened particularity, and certification, reveal Clark’s debt to
Field. Rule 1’s requirement that the Rules “be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding”70 tracks Field’s exhortation “to do justice, with the least possible
delay and expense.”71 Field had designed a certification-by-oath requirement72
that served as a prototype of Rule 11, which requires pleaders to certify that
their “factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery.”73 Rule 9’s requirement that parties must “state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” when making such
allegations,74 which Justice Stevens would later misunderstand as a repudiation
of fact pleading,75 dates back not merely to the Field Code but to common law
pleading itself.76
While on the federal bench, Judge Clark applied the Rules according to the
principle of fair notice. The textbook case77 of Dioguardi v. Durning pitted a
pro se plaintiff against a customs agent, the former alleging (in, as it were,
ordinary and concise language) that although he had been the high bidder on
certain “tonics” at auction, the agent had sold them to someone else.78 The
lower court had erroneously dismissed the case for “fail[ure] to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action” but did not explain why it believed
the plaintiff had not stated a claim.79 Judge Clark explained that the complaint,
which had laid out the date, place, and harm giving rise to the suit, sufficed to

69

FED. R. CIV. P. Form 17 (2007).
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
71 Field, supra note 22, at 243.
72 See id. at 243 (verifying pleadings by affidavit).
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
74 Id. at 9(b).
75 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (interpreting
Rule 9(b) to preclude using pleading to curb discovery abuse).
76 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 39.
77 See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
QUESTIONS 293–98 (5th ed. 2008).
78 139 F.2d 774, 774–75 (2d Cir. 1944).
79 Id.
70

MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

10/22/2010 12:48 PM

NINETEENTH-CENTURY PRINCIPLES

173

state a claim under the relevant public auction statute.80 This result followed
the principle that as long as the plaintiff provides fair notice to the defendant,
the court should not dismiss a claim for failure to observe some technical
pleading formula.
2. No Set of Facts—“A Phrase Best Forgotten as an Incomplete, Negative
Gloss on an Accepted Pleading Standard”81
Though both the text of the Rules, which comes from Field’s exegesis on
fact pleading, and Clark’s subsequent commentary affirm the fair notice model
of pleading, the Court declined to apply Rule 8 faithfully in its pleading
jurisprudence. Although Conley v. Gibson seemed to reaffirm Rule 8’s fair
notice requirement,82 it also provided a new “notice pleading” standard: a case
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless “no set of facts”
could entitle the claimant to relief.83 This permissive standard contradicted the
principle of fair notice. It seemed to prohibit courts from dismissing
complaints that offered inadequate notice if the plaintiff could possibly prove a
set of facts that would entitle him to relief. The Court did not acknowledge
this problem. As a result, two separate lines of jurisprudence emerged from
Conley. Some later cases cited Conley for the proposition that the Rules
required fair notice, the most prominent of these being Twombly itself.84 Other
cases cited Conley for its “no set of facts” language, and Justice Stevens would
have resolved Twombly according to that standard.85 This subsection of the
Comment will show that Conley was divided against itself.
The urgency of civil rights and the staid pace of civil procedure pulled
Conley apart. The Conley Court addressed the question of whether the
complaint, which alleged a union’s racial discrimination, stated a claim under
federal civil rights law.86 Justice Black, writing for the majority, summarized
the allegations as follows:
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad
at its Houston Freight House. Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the
designated bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act for the

80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 775.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
355 U.S. 41, 45, 47 (1957).
Id. at 45.
E.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563; Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577–78 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing numerous authorities).
Conley, 355 U.S. at 44.
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bargaining unit to which petitioners belonged. A contract existed
between the Union and the Railroad which gave the employees in the
bargaining unit certain protection from discharge and loss of
seniority. In May 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs
held by petitioners or other Negroes all of whom were either
discharged or demoted. In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all
but instead filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a
few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs but
with loss of seniority. Despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the
Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to protect them against
these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection
87
comparable to that given white employees.

Justice Black noted that “[i]f these allegations are proven there has been a
manifest breach of the Union’s statutory duty to represent fairly and without
hostile discrimination all of the employees in the bargaining unit,”88 which is
to say that the plaintiffs had succeeded in laying out the story of their case.
Responding to the defendants’ argument that the Rules required more factual
specificity from the complaint, Justice Black explained that complaints suffice
when they “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests” and cited the Forms as “plainly
demonstrat[ing] this.”89
That aspect of the case correctly applied Field’s and Judge Clark’s
principles as enacted in the Federal Rules, but the remainder of the decision
both misapplied the Rules and contradicted the foregoing dicta. The
centerpiece of the Court’s error was its assertion that “a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.”90 Among its authorities for declaring this “the accepted rule”
was, surprisingly, Judge Clark’s opinion in Dioguardi v. Durning, which held
no such thing.91

87 Id. at 43. Justice Black’s summary goes on to include some allegations that the Twombly Court would
likely have considered conclusory. See infra Part III.A.1.
88 Conley, 355 U.S. at 46.
89 Id. at 47.
90 Id. at 45–46.
91 See Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 62, at 53–54. In a note excerpted by Judge Clark, the Rules
Committee explained that Dioguardi “was not based on any holding that a pleader is not required to supply
information disclosing a ground for relief. The complaint in that case stated a plethora of facts and the court so
construed them as to sustain the validity of the pleading.” Id.
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This no set of facts standard fit neither the text of the Rules nor the
principles that underlie them. Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to “show,” not
merely assert, that he “is entitled to relief,”92 by relating in the complaint the
story of his case.93 A plaintiff could fail to provide fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and yet satisfy this standard94—in
an extreme case by pleading, “The defendant is liable to me.” This standard
also would permit pleadings that violate Rule 11’s requirement that in the
plaintiff’s representations to the court, his “factual contentions . . . will likely
have evidentiary support,”95 a degree of confidence stricter than the Conley
Court’s “beyond doubt” formulation. Though these two Rules lack any
explicit connection, reading them in conjunction would result in an anomaly.
It would allow pleadings whose contentions are merely not beyond doubt but
require lawyers to certify that those same contentions are likely to find
evidentiary support. The breadth of the no set of facts standard strips from the
trial judge the discretion to administer Rule 8 justly, speedily, and
inexpensively in accordance with the historical meaning of Rule 1.96 A system
of pleading can satisfy Rule 1 “only as it tends to . . . enabl[e] the parties the
better to prepare for trial” or “assist[] the jury and the Court in judging the
cause.”97 Rule 84 states that the Forms “illustrate the simplicity and brevity
that these rules contemplate.”98 Yet, as Judge Clark had explained,99 they too
require more factual detail than notice pleading under no set of facts.
The remainder of this Comment assumes that the no set of facts standard
constitutes Conley’s holding. A narrow reading of this case would regard the
“fair notice” language as the holding: this stricter test would have reached the
same result because the Conley complaint contained the full story of the
plaintiff’s case. However, cases all the way through Justice Stevens’s dissent
in Twombly have cited “no set of facts” as the Conley holding.100 Regardless
92

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
See supra Part I.B.
94 See Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting conflict between
“no set of facts” and “grounds upon which it rests” language).
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
96 Id. at 1.
97 FIELD, supra note 22, at 243 (“The legitimate end of every administration of law is to do justice, with
the least possible delay and expense. Every system of pleading is useful only as it tends to this end. This it
can do but in one of two ways: either by enabling the parties the better to prepare for trial, or by assisting the
jury and the Court in judging the cause.”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules should be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 84.
99 See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
100 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38.
93
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of what Justice Black might have meant by that phrase in 1957, by the time
Twombly came down fifty years later “no set of facts” had come to signify a
fully articulated pleading doctrine. It remains the most plausible alternative to
the fair notice standard that Field created, that Twombly reaffirmed, and that
this Comment advocates.
II. THE RESTORATION OF FAIR NOTICE
In revisiting Conley v. Gibson to resolve the tension between the fair notice
cases and the no set of facts cases, this Comment argues that the Court decided
Twombly correctly because it chose to restore fair notice as the pleading
standard rather than articulate a new, third way. As a jurisprudential matter,
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly could legitimately overrule Conley’s precedent
only if the Court could claim that its standard better reflects the original
meaning of Rule 8 than Conley did, because otherwise the doctrine of stare
decisis would militate against unsettling the law.101 The question whether
Twombly, along with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, faithfully captured the history runs
deeper than merely passing judgment on that case because, as this Comment
argues,102 the Twombly-Iqbal standard’s historical roots can guide judges
through a consistent and fair analytical method where the Court’s binding
authority does not provide a clear rule of decision.
This Comment has shown that the two major historical goals of pleading
reform were advancing the parties’ interest in procedural fairness and the
systemic interest in resolving cases on the merits.103 This Part argues that
Twombly and Iqbal share these same two goals. The Twombly Court stated
that it considers fair notice to be Conley’s actual holding.104 It rejected the idea
that the no set of facts standard has served, or could serve, as a pleading
standard when taken literally.105 Both Twombly and Iqbal discuss a
“plausibility” standard,106 i.e., that courts should dismiss for failure to state a
“plausible claim.” Although it may seem to be an improvisation of the

101 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577–78 & n.4 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing numerous authorities employing no set of facts as the established standard).
102 See infra Part III.
103 See supra Part I.
104 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–63 (majority opinion) (focusing on the “fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” requirement as the Conley holding (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
105 Id. at 562.
106 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
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Twombly Court, plausibility represents not so much a new standard as a gloss
on fair notice.
The Court’s concept of plausibility encompasses both of the fair notice
reforms, and this Comment shows how to break the Court’s plausibility
analysis into these components. Part II.A reveals how the Twombly and Iqbal
Courts’ analysis of the respective complaints’ notice comports with the “story
of the case” theory of notice107 as understood by David Dudley Field and Judge
Clark. The Court probed each story for holes in the notice that it provided to
determine whether it stated a claim, a process that this Comment terms “noticegap analysis.” Part II.B demonstrates that the policy driving the Twombly
Court’s decision follows David Dudley Field’s principle that “[d]ear justice is
no justice,”108 prohibiting a structure of litigation in which manifest unfairness
to defendants would preclude the resolution of cases on their merits. Although
the Court did not explicitly incorporate this principle into its test, neither did
the Court exclude it,109 and its thorough policy discussion suggests that lower
courts should consider this principle when applying Twombly-Iqbal to other
areas of law. This Comment structures the Court’s policy analysis as follows:
where a complaint has a notice gap and the defendant would, as a result of that
gap, suffer an unfair burden from proceeding to discovery, the judge should
defer to the defendant’s interest in procedural fairness by dismissing the case.
This Comment refers to this as the “deference principle.”
A. Plausible Notice as Story of the Case
This section of the Comment shows how the Court’s “plausibility” analysis
in Twombly and Iqbal does not illegitimately depart from pleading traditions
but rather restores the traditional fair notice inquiry to its proper place in
pleading jurisprudence. Working through the Twombly opinion, the Twombly
Court reconstructed from the complaint the story about the defendants’ alleged
wrong and identified the gaps in the notice it provided. Although the Court
characterized the problem in terms of the complaint not plausibly giving rise to
the inference that the defendant was liable,110 the Court’s treatment of the issue
implies that, but for the notice gaps, the complaint would have stated a
claim.111 In the Iqbal opinion, the Court stated outright that the complaint
107
108
109
110
111

See supra Part I.B.
FIELD, supra note 22, at 247.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 569 n.14.
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would have survived the motion to dismiss if the complaint had contained
certain crucial facts.112 In each case, plausibility does not add anything to the
fair notice analysis, and the Court could have reached the same result even if it
had omitted the plausibility language.
1. Story of the Case in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
The beginning of this Comment described Twombly-Iqbal as the solution to
a crisis in the law, and a review of Twombly’s facts demonstrates the
importance not only of resolving the individual case but also of repairing a
broken pleading rule that invited large-scale discovery abuse. The defendants
in Twombly comprised a group of large telecommunications firms, whose
customer base includes virtually all Americans.113 In an attempt to encourage
competition in the industry, Congress enacted a statute to force local carriers to
license their local communications infrastructure to their competitors.114 The
defendants chose not to take advantage of this option, electing instead to avoid
the competition that would result if their competitors reciprocated, a business
practice known as “conscious parallelism.”115 As long as each defendant did
so unilaterally, the defendants’ actions collectively would not constitute a
“conspiracy in restraint of trade” in violation of antitrust law.116 The complaint
alleged, however, that the defendants had engaged in such a conspiracy.117
The plaintiffs contemplated a class action of all subscribers to telephone or
internet service.118 A similar group of present and future subscribers would
bear the costs of litigating it. This group is so extensive that the discovery
burdens would constitute a de facto tax collected by a private IRS.

112

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009).
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“[P]laintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all
subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United States . . . .”).
114 Id. at 549.
115 Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954).
116 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552, 564 (“[A]llegations of parallel business conduct, taken alone, do not
state a claim under” the relevant antitrust statute.). But see Clark, Special Pleading, supra note 65, at 52
(conscious parallelism alone can give rise to an inference of conspiracy). There are two reasons why the latter
should not be troubling. First, inasmuch as the Twombly Court read Theater Enterprises’s plus factors
differently from Clark—as substantive elements of a conspiracy claim—they would require at least some
independent factual support. Second, as this Comment explains in more detail in Part III.A.2, whether to draw
an inference of this sort in a particular case will depend on whether the circumstances present (as here) a
“strong countervailing inference” against the plaintiff’s allegations.
117 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
118 Id. at 559.
113
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Much of the confusion about Twombly arises from the Court’s poor
explanation of the plausibility standard it used to determine the sufficiency of
notice. Justice Souter opened by quoting the “fair notice” line from Conley,
which he then defined as “plausible grounds to infer” the wrong alleged.119 He
explained that a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but
mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of the
cause of action” does not suffice.120 He further stated that a complaint requires
“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made”:
not so much fact as to meet a “probability requirement” but enough “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.”121 This hodgepodge of vague categories provided little guidance
about how to settle close questions.
The Court instead began to reveal its method in rejecting Conley’s “no set
of facts” language. Justice Souter described the no set of facts standard “as an
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”122 He understood Conley as a
case whose complaint would have survived the fair notice standard,123 such
that the “no set of facts” language misleads the reader about what the Conley
Court did.124 Justice Souter regarded the Conley Court as having “described
the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”125
The merits of this understanding aside, Justice Souter here seemed to consider
the term “set of facts” as analogous to Field’s story of the case. Further, he
quoted approvingly language from circuit decisions that “a complaint . . . must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory”126 and

119

Id. at 555–56.
Id. at 555.
121 Id. at 556.
122 Id. at 563.
123 See supra Part I.C.2.
124 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63 (“[N]o set of facts” language “should be understood in light of the
opinion’s preceding summary of the complaint’s concrete allegations, which the Court quite reasonably
understood as amply stating a claim for relief.”).
125 Id. at 563.
126 Id. at 562 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
120
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that “we do not think that Conley imposes a duty on the courts to conjure up
unpleaded facts.”127
The Court then provided two examples of its notice analysis, each of which
follows the notice gap model. Had the complaint alleged agreement directly,
said Justice Souter, “we doubt that the complaint’s references to an agreement
among the [defendants] would have given the notice required by Rule 8.”128
The complaint “mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the
alleged conspiracies. . . . furnish[ing] no clue as to which of the four
[defendants] (much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when
and where the illicit agreement took place.”129 Souter contrasted these notice
gaps with old Form 9’s model complaint, which he considered as a model for
the complete factual picture that the Rules contemplate.130
To judge the plaintiffs’ attempt at indirect proof, the Court also attempted
to put together a story of their case that complied with Rule 8. The relevant
substantive law requires a plaintiff attempting to prove conspiracy indirectly to
show not only conscious parallelism but also “plus factors,” particular kinds of
circumstantial evidence that more strongly suggest a conspiracy.131 Justice
Souter used this structure—parallelism, then plus factors—to model his
pleading analysis,132 presumably on the theory that the plaintiffs would not be
“entitled to relief” unless they could later prove one of those plus factors. The
factual material in the complaint tended to establish only parallel conduct: the
complaint described each defendant engaging in various business practices
resisting competition, which served each individual defendant’s interests
without requiring collusion.133
The notice gap here consisted of the plus factors’ absence. When Souter
asked whether anything in the complaint “invest[ed] either the action or
inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy,”134 he meant that if
he could characterize any of the allegations as suggesting more than mere
127 Id. (quoting O’Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128 Id. at 565 n.10.
129 Id.
130 See id. (contrasting old Form 9 with allegations in the Twombly complaint that gave the defendants “no
clue” how to respond).
131 Id. at 552–53.
132 See id. at 557 (“An allegation of parallel conduct . . . gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but
without some further factual enhancement it stops short” of sufficiency.).
133 Id. at 566.
134 Id.
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parallel conduct, such an allegation could fill in the complaint’s notice gap. He
analyzed each allegation that approached a plus factor, but determined that
none of them did more than redundantly describe various courses of the
defendants’ parallel conduct.135 In other words, with the information at their
disposal, the plaintiffs could accuse the defendants only of activities that would
not, in and of themselves, incur liability.136 The notice gap here meant that the
complaint did not, in the ordinary sense, state a claim: instead of using
discovery to flesh out a dispute that existed prior to the outset of litigation, the
plaintiffs hoped to use discovery to create a new dispute and extract from the
defendants its settlement value.137
Over the course of its notice analysis, the Court took care to distinguish the
allegations that provided notice from those that merely explained the legal
consequences of those allegations. Justice Souter described the former as
“[f]actual allegations” and the latter as “conclusory allegations,”138 raising the
specter of the “ultimate facts” doctrine and its phony distinctions between
“legal conclusions,” “ultimate facts,” and “evidentiary facts.”139 Recall the
lesson Judge Clark drew from the ultimate facts debacle: judges should gauge
allegations’ merit not on the basis of formalistic criteria but on whether those
allegations offer the defendant any actual notice.140 Despite his terms’
unfortunate resemblance, Justice Souter avoided those mistakes. The
allegations that he deemed “conclusory” afforded the defendants no notice of
how the plaintiffs believed the defendants harmed them, but instead only
described the legal effect of the unpleaded conduct that they hoped to unearth
during discovery, supposing that defendants had in fact engaged in such
wrongful conduct.141 Because such allegations only inform the reader of the
inferences the complainant hopes to elicit, providing no notice about the
dispute itself, Justice Souter appropriately disregarded them in his notice-gap
analysis.

135

Id. at 566–69.
This constitutes a Rule 11 violation. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.2.
137 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (noting that the prospect of discovery abuse increases the settlement
value of the case).
138 Id. at 555, 557.
139 See supra Part I.B.
140 See supra Part I.C.1.
141 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
136
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Justice Stevens dissented, his substantive argument142 amounting to the
proposition that courts should ignore notice gaps to facilitate the plaintiffs’
bar’s role as private antitrust regulators. Quoting Adam Smith, Justice Stevens
claimed that “[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”143 The majority observed that,
according to Justice Stevens’s inference, meeting together for merriment and
diversion would force the tradesman to “devote financial and human capital to
hire lawyers, prepare for depositions, and otherwise fend off allegations of
conspiracy . . . .”144 Although in some cases Justice Stevens’s standard might
uncover conspiracies against the public that would otherwise have remained
hidden, it would also allow private parties to infringe on tradesmen’s right to
partake in merriment and diversion, by attaching discovery costs to it. The
majority worried that plaintiffs would use the broader investigatory powers
that Justice Stevens envisioned as a license to engage in profiteering.145 This
would undercut whatever civic good might come from increasingly vigorous
private antitrust enforcement.
Twombly, then, is not an example of a hard case making bad law so much
as an easy case making vague law. The no set of facts standard demanded the
Court indulge the Twombly plaintiffs in, at best, tilting at windmills. The
complaint was insufficient to such an extreme that the Court need not have
articulated a precise pleading standard to dispose of the case. In what
retrospectively seems a misguided exercise of minimalism, it chose to leave
that standard for a future, subtler case. Further, Twombly demonstrates the
enduring value of Field’s draftsmanship. Even though the Court apparently

142 Justice Stevens’s dissent also contained a historical argument about “notice pleading” under the Rules.
Id. at 573–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra Parts I.B and I.C.1 for a discussion of this history. The
sources Justice Stevens cited in support of the proposition that the original meaning of Rule 8(a)(2) (as
distinguished from the later caselaw misinterpreting it) established a system of notice pleading actually
maintained the opposite. Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587–88 & n.8 (citing Clark, Special Pleading, supra
note 62, at 46) (chastising the majority’s deviation from “notice pleading”), with Clark, Special Pleading,
supra note 62, at 50 (chastising a lower court judge for describing the Rules as a system of notice pleading);
compare also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576 (using old Form 9 as an example of Rule 8 requiring only “general
notice-giving”), with CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38 (using old Form 9 as an example of Rule 8
requiring fact pleading rather than mere notice-giving).
143 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 591 (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 54 (1852)) (alteration in original).
144 Id. at 567 n.12 (majority opinion).
145 See id. at 558–59 (explaining the potential for abuse inherent in the expensive antitrust discovery
process).
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ignored the historical record, it nonetheless interpreted the “short and plain”
language much as Field had intended.146
2. Notice-Gap Analysis in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Like Twombly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal presented a crisis whose improper
resolution would have severe consequences for the public interest, but this time
the plaintiffs threatened public officialdom rather than private commerce. The
plaintiffs alleged that federal officials had violated their civil rights by
rounding them up after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the basis of their
race rather than on genuine suspicion of wrongdoing.147 Rather than bring suit
only against the officials immediately responsible for the alleged harm, the
complaint attempted to go all the way to the top, as it were, and charged the
then-Attorney General with masterminding a scheme of illegal
discrimination.148 Civil rights jurisprudence contains an affirmative defense of
qualified immunity that functions like the plus factors in antitrust. The
plaintiff must provide a particular sort of circumstantial evidence—specific
intent to discriminate—to establish liability at trial.149 Like its counterpart in
Twombly, the Iqbal complaint sought to rely on inferences from facts arguably
consistent with either permissible conduct, by crafting a policy that
incidentally affected one race more than others, or impermissible
discrimination, by using the public-policy rationale as a pretext to injure a
disfavored race.150 This litigation presented a systemic problem of exposing
high officials to the burdens of defending suits brought on the basis of their
subordinates’ wrongdoing, even against plaintiffs who could not articulate any
connection between the harm and the defendant-official beyond an attenuated
supervisory relationship.151
The Iqbal Court refined the vague notice standard from Twombly into an
analysis that more straightforwardly applies the traditional story-of-the-case
understanding of pleading. Justice Kennedy began “by taking note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional
discrimination against officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified

146
147
148
149
150
151

See supra Part I.B.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
Id. at 1942.
Id. at 1947–49.
Id. at 1949.
Id. at 1953–54.
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immunity.”152 This reaffirmed Field’s principle that the complaint should
frame the case by pleading to all the points in dispute.153 He then organized
the Twombly notice analysis into two prongs: first, separate the “factual”
allegations, which provide notice, from the “conclusory” allegations, which do
not; and second, add up the factual allegations to determine whether they
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”154 In a manner recalling Judge
Clark’s principle that what constitutes notice depends on the circumstances of
the case,155 Kennedy described the inquiry as a “task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”156
In separating the factual from the conclusory allegations, Justice Kennedy
examined each allegation with an eye toward its eventual place in the story of
the plaintiff’s case. The allegations that “the [FBI], under the direction of [one
of the defendants], arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as
part of its investigation of the events of September 11” and “[t]he policy of
holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by [the
defendants] in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001,” each
provided notice to the defendant about how the plaintiff intended to prove
those elements of his case.157 Both of them would have guided the discovery
process toward particular facts to prove or disprove.
The complaint did not state a claim, however, because it lacked the final,
crucial piece of the story. The claims “rest[ed] solely on their ostensible
‘policy of holding post-September-11th detainees’ . . . once they were
categorized as ‘of high interest.’”158 To finish this story, the plaintiff needed to
show “that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying postSeptember-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or
national origin.”159 None of the allegations in the complaint provided notice of
what facts had led the plaintiff to believe that the defendants had acted with a
discriminatory state of mind.160
152

Id. at 1947.
See supra Part I.B.
154 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
155 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38.
156 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
157 Id. at 1951 (third alteration in original).
158 Id. at 1952.
159 Id.
160 If the plaintiff had no objective reason to believe this, then these pleadings violated Rule 11. See infra
Parts III.A.1, III.B.2.
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The dissent, written by Twombly’s author, Justice Souter, contested
Kennedy’s treatment of certain conclusory statements. Justice Souter
contended that the Court had “no principled basis” for disregarding allegations
attributing an improper motive to the defendants.161 The statements he would
have credited alleged that “after September 11, the FBI designated Arab
Muslim detainees as being of ‘high interest’ ‘because of the race, religion, and
national origin of the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the
detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,’” and that the
defendants “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed’ to that
discrimination.”162
The principled basis distinguishing what the majority regarded as factual
from what it regarded as conclusory comes from the traditional understanding
of fair notice. The statements that the majority and the dissent agreed are
factual explain what the plaintiff would endeavor to prove. For example, the
allegation about the defendants crafting a detainment policy “in discussions in
the weeks after September 11, 2001,”163 though not very specific, puts the
defendants in a position to admit or contest a fact. The defendants can answer
this allegation by contesting or conceding whether the “discussions” actually
took place. The two statements Justice Souter disputed merely claimed that the
defendants had a particular state of mind without providing any supporting
facts.164 The defendants presumably knew whether they committed the alleged
discrimination, but these statements did not inform them of the facts that led
the plaintiff to infer the defendants’ wrongful intent. Discovery and judgment,
though, would focus not on the defendants’ actual mental state but on facts that
would resolve the issue under an external standard.165
The comparison between these statements demonstrates the connection
between the duty to provide notice and the right to undertake discovery. The
nonconclusory statements, though broad, defined the scope of potential
discovery by identifying facts for discovery to confirm or refute. The
conclusory statements anticipated an open-ended discovery, wherein the
plaintiff could have conducted any inquiry that might uncover a fact relevant to
161

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
163 Id. at 1944 (majority opinion).
164 See id. at 1952 (“[R]espondent’s complaint does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to
plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”).
165 See generally HOLMES, supra note 24, at 130–63 (describing how, although intentional torts often
feature apparently moral elements such as “malice,” the law adjudicates them based on objective standards
susceptible to factual inquiry rather than subjective standards that examine the defendant’s psychology).
162
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the defendants’ mental state. Any confirmation of these conclusory statements
could only come about indirectly. That is, if the allegations about the
defendants’ mental states are accurate, then some directly confirmable fact
must exist from which a court could infer the defendants’ wrongful intent.
Presumably, the plaintiff chose a formulation that the majority understood as
“conclusory” because he could not allege any particular facts to illustrate the
defendants’ intent. Instead, he was merely guessing that it was true without
any objective basis for a good-faith allegation—a violation of Rule 11.166
Without providing such facts, the plaintiff did not fulfill his duty to provide
notice, which would have entitled him to discovery.
B. The Court’s Policy Rationale as Deference Principle
The question of whether the complaint has a notice gap does not fully
dispose of the issue. In both Twombly and Iqbal, the Court detailed the
consequences, both for the particular defendants and for the system as a whole,
of wrongly allowing each of those cases to proceed to discovery despite the
notice gaps in their respective complaints.167 In neither case did the holding
depend on the policy rationale. The Court described its methodology strictly in
terms of plausible notice.168 Nonetheless, the Court chose to discuss the
importance of its reaching the correct result in each case, even at the risk of
inviting charges of bad faith. Cynics might assume that the ostensible holding
operated as a pretext for a political agenda that in fact decided the cases.
This Comment argues that the Court’s reasoning about policy should
control in cases where the complaint has notice gaps that do not impose the
kind of unfair burdens that the Court described in Twombly and Iqbal. A
reading of these cases as requiring dismissal of all complaints that contain
notice gaps is also consistent with those cases’ holdings. However, such a
reading would render the Court’s policy arguments redundant and rest the case
less easily on the traditions of pleading. At the core of both David Dudley
Field’s pleading reforms and Judge Clark’s updates to them was an overriding
166

See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.2.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“[W]e are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified
immunity for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of
their duties.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[O]nly by taking care to require
allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy [can we] hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense
of discovery . . . .”).
168 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not
entitled to discovery . . . .”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”).
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mandate to resolve cases on the merits rather than on technicalities.169 The
notice-gap inquiry itself affords some flexibility to infer facts that are
“presumed or may properly come from the other side.”170 Supplementing this
with a principle of fairness to moderate notice-gap dismissal would better
situate Twombly-Iqbal jurisprudence in the Rules, the first of which demands a
construction that secures not only the “speedy” and “inexpensive”
determination of cases but also the “just.”171
This Comment derives from the two policy arguments in Twombly and
Iqbal a broader principle of deference to defendants in all cases where
complaints deficient in notice would impose unfair burdens on them. In
Twombly, the Court inferred that the open-ended, expensive discovery process,
coupled with the high degree of uncertainty that the discovery would reveal
anything relevant to the case, would likely preclude a resolution of the case on
the merits.172 Instead, the Court expected the suit to settle for its nuisance
value, which would have inflicted an unfair burden on the defendant.173 In
Iqbal, similar notice gaps would have allowed the plaintiff, but for the Court’s
intervention, to make an end run around qualified immunity and harass a top
official over what was essentially a political rather than a legal dispute.174
Punishing an official for pursuing a controversial but not illegal policy, by
exposing him to the burdens of defense and discovery, would both unduly
harm him and compromise his ability to serve the public interest.175
1. Protection of Private Interests in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Once the Court had established that the complaint in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly did not tell the full story of the claim against the defendants, it
considered the likely harms that the defendants, as well as other defendants in
similar cases, would suffer from allowing such deficient complaints to proceed
to discovery. Deficient complaints present jurisdictional problems. They ask
courts not to command discovery to prepare disputes already in existence for
trial, but rather to attempt to develop inchoate disputes to maturity. This
indulgence can allow “a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim . . . to take up

169
170
171
172
173
174
175

See supra Parts I.B, I.C.1.
CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38; see also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See supra Part II.A.1; infra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.A.1; infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.2.
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the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in
terrorem increment of the settlement value.”176
The scope and expense of Twombly’s prospective discovery impressed
upon the Court the importance of preventing abuse. Justice Souter described
the scale of the likely costs as “obvious enough”:
[P]laintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all
subscribers to local telephone or high-speed Internet service in the
continental United States, in an action against America’s largest
telecommunications firms (with many thousands of employees
generating reams and gigabytes of business records) for unspecified
(if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly occurred over a
177
period of seven years.

The prospect of systemic problems, which would arise from a rule allowing
plaintiffs to proceed against defendants in like cases, counsels against a
permissive attitude toward deficient complaints. The Court embraced a policy
that “this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.”178 This follows
the rule of construction promoting “just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination.”179 In support of this policy, Justice Souter cited the “unusually
high cost of discovery,” which can account for “as much as 90 percent of
litigation costs when discovery is actively employed.”180 Justice Souter also
noted that once cases reach discovery, judges can do little to manage the
costs.181
Contrasted against Justice Stevens’s dissent, the majority’s test becomes a
conscious choice to defer to defendants rather than to plaintiffs. Justice
Stevens began Part II of his dissent by reminding the reader that Conley
reversed a decision dismissing a complaint by black railway workers alleging
workplace discrimination during the Civil Rights Era.182
Only after
substituting these sympathetic plaintiffs could he argue that a “no lawsuit left
behind” policy would fit a case like Twombly. Setting aside the Twombly
majority’s assertion that the Conley complaint would survive a Twombly
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 558 (alteration in original).
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 559.
Id. at 559–60 & n.6.
Id. at 576 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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motion to dismiss, Justice Stevens overlooked the possibility that a flexible
deference principle could distinguish between a Conley and a Twombly.183 The
language from his dissent quoting Adam Smith about tradesmen conspiring
against the public evinced a cavalier attitude toward charges of commercial
malfeasance.184 This perhaps explains his willingness to defer to plaintiffs
rather than defendants in Twombly and similar cases.
A political question also underlies Twombly’s controversy. The Court
mentions in passing that “Congress may have expected” some of the
defendants to compete with the others but judges that “the disappointment does
not make conspiracy plausible.”185 To put the point more directly, Congress
attempted to introduce more competition to the telecommunications
industry,186 but its efforts did not meet expectations. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs
attempted to bootstrap this failed policy into a conspiracy by res ipsa
loquitur,187 they would have usurped from Congress the responsibility to
amend a poorly conceived law. This should give some pause to a Court with
constitutional jurisdiction over cases and controversies rather than political
questions, and the Court rightly avoids “expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government”188 by leaving the matter for Congress to
fix, should it choose to do so.
In constructing a deference principle from Twombly, the two factors above
should weigh in courts’ deference analysis for complaints with notice gaps.
Judges should dismiss complaints describing inchoate disputes whose merits
are so remote as to settle primarily on the basis of nuisance value. In other
words, discovery burdens become unfair when a careful inquiry into the
complaint eliminates any conclusion other than that the plaintiffs are pursuing
the case primarily for opportunistic reasons.
2. Protection of Public Interests in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Ashcroft v. Iqbal served as Twombly’s public-interest counterpart by
raising, in a suit against public officials, discovery burdens analogous to those
183

See infra Part III.B.
See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
185 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 (majority opinion).
186 Id. at 544.
187 The Twombly plaintiffs were attempting an end run around Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), in which the Court held that this congressional policy
did not expand the scope of telecommunications companies’ antitrust liability.
188 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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leveled against private parties in Twombly. Unlike Twombly, Iqbal involved a
genuine dispute antecedent to the filing of the action, in which the plaintiff
accused federal law enforcement officers of egregious civil rights violations.189
The question that reached the Iqbal Court on certiorari, however, did not
involve these concrete allegations. Instead, it took up an ancillary claim. The
Iqbal plaintiff had attempted to shoehorn top officials at the Department of
Justice into the case, including the Attorney General of the United States, by
way of an unsubstantiated conspiracy theory.190
Iqbal demonstrates how the same policies that have generated special
evidentiary standards, such as the “plus factors” in Twombly’s antitrust
claim191 or the wrongful intent here needed to overcome qualified immunity,192
require corresponding pleading standards. As Justice Kennedy explains, “[t]he
basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the
concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”193
Further,
[i]f a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to
the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is
counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is attendant
to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how
it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that
officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the
Government. The costs of diversion are only magnified when
Government officials are charged with responding to . . . a national
and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of
194
the American Republic.

The key to understanding the Court’s policy here comes from Justice
Kennedy’s assertion that qualified immunity protects government officials not
just from liability but from “litigation.” Otherwise, discovery could have
proceeded. Assuming it would fail to turn up any evidence to prove the
defendants’ wrongful intent, qualified immunity would mandate judgment for
the defendants and vindicate their right to avoid liability.
189
190
191
192
193
194

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943–44 (2009).
Id. at 1944.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.2.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Failing to construe substantive-law evidentiary requirements as protections
against litigation, not merely liability, and thereby failing to enforce them as
pleading requirements, robs them of their value in promoting the public
policies that underlie them. Had this case proceeded through discovery, even a
favorable summary judgment would have handed the defendants only a Pyrrhic
victory. By then, the damage Justice Kennedy described would have been
done. Especially in a suit for money damages, the difference between
“discovery costs” and “liability” can become a matter of form rather than
substance. If a defendant were to settle a suit that he would have won on the
merits because the litigation costs would exceed the settlement offer, he would
suffer a monetary loss just as if the protection from liability did not exist. The
only difference would be the dollar amount. Moreover, qualified immunity
doctrine exists to promote the public interest in the “proper execution of the
work of the Government,” benefitting public officials only incidentally.195
Only by barring discovery to plaintiffs who cannot provide notice of how they
would overcome qualified immunity at trial could courts “give real content to
the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither
deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties.”196
Iqbal’s subtext also presents a political question best handled through the
political branches of government. A looser pleading standard on state of mind
for supervisory liability would allow any plaintiff with a claim against a
government employee to yank a cabinet member or similarly high-ranking
official into litigation, no matter how attenuated the connection, by alleging
that the claim arose from a deliberate, wrongful policy crafted by that high
official. The need to generate a return on investment at least places some
limits on entrepreneurial strike suits like Twombly. Anyone long on money
and short on scruples could finance frivolous litigation to punish officials for
making unpopular policy decisions, even to the point of driving them out of
office.197
Iqbal points to two factors that should play a role in deference analysis.
When cases directly affect the public interest through discovery that would
burden public officials or public resources, courts should not indulge plaintiffs
who cannot tell a complete story to define the dispute. This serves as
195

Id.
Id. at 1954.
197 Cf. Kevin Bohn, Ethics Complaints Follow Palin, CNN (July 24, 2009, 11:23 PM), http://www.cnn.
com/2009/POLITICS/07/24/palin.ethics/index.html (relating a former Alaska governor’s claim that an
avalanche of frivolous ethics complaints caused her to retire before finishing her term).
196

MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL

192

10/22/2010 12:48 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

something of a corollary to the political question factor,198 which was also in
play in Iqbal. A complaint is no substitute for a ballot. Courts subvert the
integrity of the democratic process when they grant the losers a second vote
through litigation. Additionally, the presence of a political dimension common
to each of these cases suggests that the deference principle may counsel strict
dismissal only in a narrow band of cases. This would minimize TwomblyIqbal’s disruption of the status quo ante.
III. TWO PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING JURISPRUDENCE
As this Comment has demonstrated,199 the Twombly-Iqbal pleading
jurisprudence consists of two major concepts: probing the complaint for gaps
in the notice it provides and determining whether the court should defer to the
defendant on the basis of unfair burdens that discovery would impose. This
Part extrapolates these two concepts, from the history of pleading as filtered
through Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,200 into a noticegap principle and a deference principle. The notice-gap principle judges a
complaint’s notice deficient when the facts as stated, along with any
reasonable inferences those facts would support, do not comprise a complete
story of how the defendant came to be liable to the plaintiff. The deference
principle counsels the court to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
only when, as a result of the complaint’s deficiencies, the court could not fairly
ask the defendant to assume the burdens of litigation.
This Comment organizes these two principles into a two-step process.
First, the judge determines whether the complaint provides the defendant
sufficient notice. Different kinds of legal disputes can revolve around
wrongdoing ranging from a single instance of harm to misconduct on a grand
scale. The kinds of facts that make up a well-pleaded complaint will likewise
vary from claim to claim.201 The judge uses “judicial experience and common
sense”202 in weighing the inferences from the plaintiff’s allegations against
countervailing inferences. This allows him to figure whether the complaint
describes a genuine antecedent dispute or merely seeks to create a dispute
through discovery. Second, if the judge determines that the complaint has a
gap in the notice that it provides, he then ascertains whether the notice gap
198
199
200
201
202

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 38.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
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would impose any unfair burden on the defendant were the case to proceed to
discovery. The plaintiff might seek to exploit the expense of discovery in
extorting an “in terrorem increment of the settlement value,”203 to gain access
to the defendant’s valuable secrets without any good-faith intent to use them in
the present case, or simply to harass the defendant. When the judge senses any
of these injustices, he should defer to the defendant’s right to privacy and
dismiss the complaint. This deference principle operates as an equitable rule
of reason, keeping meritorious cases in court and frivolous cases out.
A. The Notice-Gap Principle
This section describes the purpose and the methodology of implementing
the notice-gap principle. The notice-gap principle provides that, by examining
the story of the plaintiff’s case for any gaps in the notice it provides, the judge
can determine whether the plaintiff seeks to move an already existing, goodfaith dispute into the court or whether he hopes to use the court’s powers
compelling discovery to develop an inchoate dispute into a cognizable claim.
To accomplish this, the judge construes the pleadings liberally, making
inferences to connect the plaintiff’s facts to the legal conclusions that would
constitute a claim. These inferences might be supplied by the plaintiff as
conclusory statements or, as in Dioguardi v. Durning,204 by the judge himself.
Judges should use these inferences to flesh out the facts in the story of the case
except when strong countervailing inferences provide compelling reasons to
disbelieve it.
1. The Genuine Antecedent Dispute Requirement
The presence of an antecedent dispute distinguishes discovery in private
civil actions from the kinds of investigatory powers that congressional
committees, administrative agencies, and grand juries possess. Rule 8 does not
allow a plaintiff to bring suit on suspicion that he is entitled to relief; rather, he
must show that he is entitled to relief, or else his case will not survive a motion
to dismiss.205 Without the threshold requirement of a genuine antecedent
dispute, private litigants could command the broad investigatory powers of a
government body free from the political and institutional constraints that check
public actors. Equitable factors afford litigants a broad exception to this

203
204
205

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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rule,206 but the court need not consider them if the complaint provides adequate
notice in the first place.
When Rule 8 asks for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,”207 it both articulates the plaintiff’s duty to
provide notice (“showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”) and limits the
duty to a “short and plain statement.” These two parts of the Rule apparently
conflict when fair notice seems to require a statement that is long and
elaborate. This represents a mistaken understanding of “short and plain” as an
absolute rather than relative term. A short and plain Hemingway novel208
might measure hundreds of pages. A paragraph that lasts even a single page is
long. “Short and plain” means that courts should not require complaints any
longer or more elaborate than necessary to provide fair notice to the defendant.
Courts need only determine how much notice is necessary.
The increasing complexity of some civil claims has forced this issue. The
original theory of notice pleading envisioned a light burden at the pleading
stage both for plaintiffs and defendants. The former would be free to plead in
plain language.
The latter would receive a concise, straightforward
explanation of the charges against them. As new and complex causes of action
developed,209 this complexity had to fall on either plaintiffs or defendants. If
plaintiffs could plead complex causes of action in filings as simple and short as
before, then those pleadings would not give defendants the full story of the
claims against them that they had previously enjoyed. If pleadings’ detail and
length increased in proportion to the complexity of the newer causes of action,
then plaintiffs would need to gather more information before they could craft
pleadings that would bring their disputes into the courts’ jurisdiction. The
increased difficulties of providing notice, along with similar difficulties of
making do without it, require reexamining from the bottom up how much
notice the system can practically expect plaintiffs to give defendants.
Complaints involving traditional causes of action rarely require a subtle
understanding of notice. Field modeled pleading to allow “any plain man,
hearing the parties’ own statements [to] get a better understanding, in half an
hour, of the points in dispute between them, than the most astute lawyer can
206

See infra Part III.B.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
208 See, e.g., ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SUN ALSO RISES (1926) (a veteran, emasculated by a war wound,
falls for a lovely alcoholic, but malaise and anatomy preclude consummation).
209 For instance, neither the antitrust claim in Twombly nor the civil rights claims in Conley and Iqbal
resemble the simple disputes in the Forms. See supra Part II.
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get from our modern records.”210 As such, the plaintiff’s story contains notice
gaps if and only if it lacks details that a reasonable person would expect the
plaintiff to possess.
Consider a scenario in which the defendant punches the plaintiff, leading
the plaintiff to sue him for battery. Barring exceptional circumstances,
plaintiffs in such cases always know the time, place, and manner of the battery.
If the plaintiff were relating the incident to another person in an everyday
conversation unrelated to any legal proceeding, his interlocutor would expect
to hear these details. Upon hearing them, she would, like any good American,
tell the plaintiff, “You should sue.” This is what it means to state a claim. The
plaintiff relates some facts. These facts lead to the inference that the defendant
is liable to the plaintiff.
Now imagine the alternative version of this conversation, in which
conclusions precede facts. The plaintiff tells his interlocutor that the defendant
has committed a battery against him. She asks him what happened. He
replies, “I’m not sure, but I’m taking the defendant to court to find out.” This
would elicit a skeptical reaction from a reasonable person. Although as a
matter of fact the defendant may have committed a battery, the plaintiff has not
here articulated his story as a cognizable legal dispute. Moreover, the
incongruous absence of pertinent information does not suggest to the
interlocutor that the details are out there waiting to be found so much as that
there are no details. All complaints meriting dismissal fit this pattern. The
only difference between a simple tort like battery and an intricate one like
conspiracy in restraint of trade is that the complexities of the latter case allow
the plaintiff to conceal this basic truth within a Gordian Knot of conclusory
allegations.
The prior two examples serve to illustrate that legal conclusions need
factual support because, in and of themselves, they provide no notice. A legal
conclusion at its most basic would consist merely of an allegation that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff. A bare recital of the cause of action would
situate the case in a particular area of law but still tell the defendant nothing
about the circumstances that led to the accusation. The Court recognized this
in Twombly, explaining that a defendant wishing to prepare an answer to a set
of factual allegations would know what to say, but a defendant trying to
answer conclusory allegations would have “no clue.”211
210
211

FIELD, supra note 22, at 244; see also supra Part I.B.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007).
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Instead of relying on the kind of abstruse distinctions that reigned under
Code pleading, a court using the notice-gap model of analysis can differentiate
a fact from a conclusion by asking whether the defendant has any way to
answer the allegation. Factual allegations frame the discovery process. For
each such allegation, the defendant must make an admission or denial, with the
denials identifying the factual disputes to be resolved during discovery.
Conclusory allegations do not aid the efficient administration of litigation. The
defendant cannot admit them without yielding the ultimate question of liability.
When the defendant denies these conclusory allegations, discovery has no
obvious way to proceed. The plaintiff has neither committed himself to any
particular manner of proving liability nor articulated “a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged wrongdoing.212
This analysis connects the breach of duty—in providing insufficient
notice—to the harm—discovery abuse. The fewer facts the plaintiff needs to
nail down before he acquires rights of discovery against the defendant, the
more valuable to him—and the more burdensome on the defendant—those
rights of discovery become. It also shows how the defendant’s unclean hands
(e.g., by destroying information that the defendant could have accessed even
without discovery and that would have allowed the defendant to substantiate
his story) might deny him Rule 12(b)(6) relief.213 Common law and Code
pleading focused on ritual at the expense of substance. Fair notice pleading
should not delve into abstract questions of meaning except insofar as they
relate back to the concrete problem of ensuring substantial fairness to litigants.
The Court’s “plausibility” analysis also depends on notice. The term
“plausibility” is not merely unhelpful here but inaccurate.214 Cases that turn on
issues of plausibility, although they too involve insufficient notice, implicate
Rule 11, which requires the claimant to certify that “factual
contentions . . . will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery,” 215 rather than Rule 8. Prior
to Iqbal, in Tooley v. Napolitano (Tooley I), the D.C. Circuit incorrectly
reversed a dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s conspiracy theory on the grounds
that his complaint met “the federal rules’ notoriously loose pleading
criteria.”216 The plaintiff had claimed that after complaining to an airline that
212
213
214
215
216

Id. at 556.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See supra note 106.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
556 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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lax security could allow a terrorist to put a bomb on a plane, the government
began to monitor him through wiretaps, radio tags, and men in black.217 As
Chief Judge Sentelle described in his dissent, the plaintiff
would have us hold that he has adequately alleged unlawful
wiretapping of an entire extended family, including at least nine
separate phone lines based on no apparent source of belief other than
“problematic phone connections, including telltale intermittent
clicking noises.” I note in passing that there is no reason to believe
that wiretaps even cause problematic connections or intermittent
218
clicking sounds.

In Twombly and Iqbal, the Court held that the complaints were implausible
because they provided too little factual substantiation (i.e., notice). Here, each
of the complaint’s bizarre allegations pushed the plaintiff’s case further into
the realm of the fantastical, as the D.C. Circuit noted in a post-Iqbal rehearing
that overruled its prior disposition of the case.219
A complaint can be, as in Twombly, implausible because it is incomplete
or, as in Tooley, incomplete because it is implausible. Whether the court
focuses its inquiry on either plausibility or completeness of notice, it should, in
principle, reach the same result. However, an analysis that meets the notice
gap directly rather than circumspectly avoids the unnecessary complications
that come from treating complaints filed in bad faith as though they were
nonsense. The small sample of pleading cases that have recently come before
the Supreme Court, including not just Twombly and Iqbal but also Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,220 all implicate incompleteness more than
implausibility. Despite the D.C. Circuit’s misapplication of Twombly in
Tooley I, the true implausibility cases tend to be more straightforward and less
consequential than the incompleteness cases. Common sense alone can guide
the court most, if not all, of the way to the proper resolution of the former. For
the more difficult and important cases, however, the notice-gap concept better
assists courts in resolving them correctly and coherently.

217

Id. at 837.
Id. at 843–44 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting).
219 Tooley v. Napolitano (Tooley II), 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
220 See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (dismissing a private securities action for failure to allege
loss causation adequately, when the complaint alleged only one, irrelevant economic loss and “nowhere else
provide[d] the defendants with notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal
connection might be between that loss and the [underlying] misrepresentation”).
218
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Although the Court did not choose to characterize its analysis this way,
lower courts can use the notice-gap method consistently with Twombly and
Iqbal because the same determinations that resolved the plausibility inquiry
also would have disposed of those cases had the Court considered the matter as
a notice problem. In either case, but for the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations
about the claim’s plus factors, the conduct described in the complaint’s factual
statements would not have given rise to liability. For the notice method, just as
for the two-pronged analysis the Court suggests,221 the judge first determines
which of the allegations are factual (or provide notice) and credit them as true.
Then, instead of engaging in a fraught determination of whether the sum of all
these allegations amounts to a “plausible” story, a judge using notice-gap
analysis examines all of the necessary elements of the claim. For each
element, he asks whether the plaintiff’s factual allegations would satisfy that
element. If he detects any gaps, either because the plaintiff pleaded certain
elements in conclusory statements or failed to mention anything relevant to
those elements at all, then he should determine that the plaintiff has not, in the
language of Rule 8, established his right to relief.
2. The Strong Countervailing Inference Test
The principal challenge in applying pleading requirements under Rule 8
lies in the determination of which inferences to afford the plaintiff. Between
Conley and Twombly, the Court correctly overruled lower court decisions that,
balking at Conley’s no set of facts standard, attempted to solve discoveryabuse problems piecemeal by imposing particularity requirements on certain
disfavored causes of action.222 Recall that Rule 9 codified a particularity
requirement for allegations of fraud or mistake, which originated in the
common law and also appeared in the Field Code.223 Although misread as an
implied repudiation of fact pleading,224 Rule 9 supports a negative inference
that all allegations other than fraud or mistake need not be “state[d] with
particularity.”225

221

See supra text accompanying note 154.
See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (overruling heightened pleading standard
for employment discrimination claims); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (same for civil rights claims against municipalities); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (same for Title VII claims).
223 CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 23, § 39 (describing common law and Code requirements for
particularity when alleging certain causes of action).
224 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
225 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
222
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This Comment proposes a “strong countervailing inference” test to balance
the need for reasonable specificity against the textual prohibition of a
particularity requirement. This Comment derives this test from Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,226 a case decided shortly after Twombly. Tellabs
dealt with a cause of action that “requires plaintiffs to state with particularity
both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing
scienter.”227 The Court held that this standard required judges to assemble the
alleged facts into a story of the case.228 Judges would then compare the
inference necessary to credit that story against other plausible inferences to
determine that inference’s strength.229 A complaint would survive a motion to
dismiss only if the inference were “at least as compelling as any opposing
inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”230 If Tellabs represents a
heightened pleading standard, then a liberal pleading standard would accept the
plaintiff’s desired inference unless it were considerably less compelling than
an opposing inference.
The judge, then, should allow an inference for the plaintiff unless the facts
give rise to a strong countervailing inference. In a suit about a car accident, the
allegation that at a particular date and place “the defendant negligently drove a
motor vehicle against the plaintiff”231 sufficiently states a claim for
negligence.232 This allegation would probably contain a notice gap under the
Tellabs standard. These facts are also consistent with the inference that the
plaintiff’s negligence, rather than the defendant’s, caused the accident. The
judge would probably need to take judicial notice of negligence statistics in car
accidents to cross that notice gap. The plaintiff could secure his day in court
only by alleging additional facts, e.g., that the plaintiff was walking through a
designated crosswalk while the walk sign was lit and the traffic light
controlling the defendant was red. Such a pleading requirement would be
inappropriate for most cases, adding superfluous details to complaints and then
spurring Code-style litigation over whether complaints adequately plead to a
formalistic level of specificity.

226

551 U.S. 308 (2007).
Id. at 313.
228 Cf. id. at 322 (“The inquiry . . . is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a
strong inference . . . .”).
229 Id. at 323–24.
230 Id. at 324.
231 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (2007).
232 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
227
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The “strong countervailing inference” test presents no such difficulties
because these facts do not support a strong countervailing inference that the
defendant was not negligent. These facts are consistent with either party’s
negligence. No fact gives any particular reason to discredit the plaintiff’s
inference. Moreover, these facts, taken as true, necessarily would give rise to a
genuine antecedent dispute. In a situation like this, the plaintiff could fail to
state a claim only by pleading himself out of court with additional allegations
claiming, for example, that the plaintiff had jumped in front of the defendant’s
car immediately before the defendant struck him.
Note that, under Conley’s no set of facts standard, this last allegation would
not keep the plaintiff out of court. Even though this version of the complaint
gives no reason to believe that the defendant’s negligence caused the accident
and strong reason to believe that the plaintiff’s negligence did, it does not
appear beyond doubt that the defendant’s negligence could not also have
contributed enough to the accident to incur liability. This would not qualify as
a genuine antecedent dispute. The plaintiff has essentially alleged himself the
wrongdoer in the incident by stating the defendant’s potential claim against
him. It would not become a real “dispute” unless and until the “defendant”
were to make it one by seeking damages against the “plaintiff.” The “strong
countervailing inference” test strikes a balance between Tellabs’s particularity
standard, which would be inappropriately stringent for most types of claims,
and Conley’s no set of facts standard, which would be inappropriately lax.
B. The Deference Principle
Although the foregoing test would suffice to resolve cases under the
Twombly-Iqbal doctrine, this Comment proposes an additional equitable
principle of deference to defendants who would bear unfair burdens from
discovery. This principle answers the question of what a court should do when
a complaint has a harmless or minimally harmful notice gap, on the basis of the
Court’s stated rationale for the Twombly-Iqbal rule. In both Twombly and
Iqbal, the Court considered prospective discovery that would have unfairly
burdened the defendants, given the plaintiffs’ inability to bridge the notice gap
by substantiating their allegations.233 The Court did not have occasion to
consider whether a court should dismiss a complaint for insufficient notice
even when the prospective discovery would be minimally burdensome.

233

See supra Part II.A.
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This Comment’s proposed principle of deference states that courts should
only dismiss complaints for failure to state a claim if the complaint has a notice
gap and if proceeding to discovery would impose an unfair burden on the
defendant. This principle comes not from any part of the holding in Twombly
or Iqbal but from the dicta in each case about how discovery would harm each
defendant.234 When discovery promises that kind of harm, the judge should
dismiss the claim until the plaintiff can substantiate his claim well enough to
justify the intrusion into the defendant’s affairs.
This equitable principle calls on judges to apply their judicial experience
and common sense to keep meritorious cases in court and frivolous cases out.
A judge should not dismiss a case strictly on technical grounds. If the
defendant’s wrongdoing causes the notice gap, then the court should not
dismiss the complaint. The defendant should not profit from his wrongdoing.
He also vitiates the purpose of notice when he demonstrates such
consciousness of guilt. Some areas of law, such as bankruptcy, have inherent
disincentives to curb discovery abuse, and there too dismissal for all but the
most egregious notice gaps would be improper. As for keeping frivolous cases
out, the deference principle will mandate dismissal mainly in one particular
class of case, the “private prosecution.” This Comment defines the term to
describe a type of case in which an enterprising plaintiff brings suit either in
bad faith or on mere suspicion of wrongdoing, seeking to use liberal discovery
as a sort of ersatz grand jury. Just as judges in criminal cases are mindful of
the burdens that those proceedings place upon the accused, they should show
similar deference to civil defendants in cases that take on some of the character
of criminal prosecutions.
1. Keeping Meritorious Cases In
The deference principle should excuse notice-gap problems when the
notice gap comes from the defendant’s wrongdoing itself or when the notice
gap would cause little harm to the defendant. For an example of the former,
consider Wilson v. City of Chicago, in which the court denied a motion to
dismiss when the plaintiff in a conspiracy case did not know the particular
wrongdoers among a group of defendants but could otherwise plead the full

234 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (explaining that forcing officials to devote their
time to discovery rather than government would run against the public interest); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007) (worrying about undertaking expensive discovery without adequate
justification).

MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL

202

10/22/2010 12:48 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

story of the alleged conspiracy.235 According to the complaint, the policeofficer defendants coerced two witnesses into testifying against the plaintiff in
a murder trial, but the plaintiff did not know which officer did what.236 The
court correctly rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff could not
force each defendant individually to respond to the allegations in the
complaint, noting that the complaint otherwise provided enough factual detail
for each officer to admit or deny the allegations.237
The notice gap in this case came from the nature of the alleged tort itself,
and denying discovery for a minor defect here would have unfairly prejudiced
the plaintiff’s ability to vindicate his substantive rights. Unlike Twombly, in
which the plaintiff could adequately allege neither the wrong nor the
wrongdoer, here the plaintiff succeeded in alleging the harm. Because
conspiracy inherently involves concealing information, i.e., the roles of the
conspirators, crediting the complaint’s allegation of conspiracy implies
excusing that information’s absence from the complaint. The Wilson court
illustrated this problem with the following scenario:
Two police officers arrest a person, and after handcuffing him and
placing him on the ground, one officer kicks the arrestee in the head.
It would be patently unfair and illogical to force such a person to
identify which of the two officers committed the act before taking
discovery. Carried to the extreme, Defendants’ position would
prevent any plaintiff from engaging in any court-assisted discovery
238
without knowing the exact perpetrator of a tort against him.

In this situation, the erroneously accused group-member defendant finds
himself on the same footing as any other factually innocent defendant. A
plaintiff might have a good-faith but mistaken belief that a defendant injured
him, and a well-pleaded complaint laying out these allegations would allow the
plaintiff discovery. It is a feature of the American legal system as a whole,
rather than pleading doctrine specifically, that defendants bear some of the
costs of these good-faith errors.
Even for cases in which the plaintiff caused the notice gap, the deference
principle does not mandate dismissal when the defendant would suffer minimal
235

No. 09-C-2477, 2009 WL 3242300 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2009).
Id. at *1.
237 Id. at *2. The Wilson court cited Seventh Circuit precedent reaffirming, after Iqbal, the sensible rule
not to dismiss a claim whose only defect is that the defendant cannot identify an “unknown member of a
collective body.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009)).
238 Id.
236
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harm from litigating the case. The prime example of this situation comes from
bankruptcy law. Several features of bankruptcy proceedings protect litigants
from the same problems that prompted Twombly-Iqbal, making the latter
mostly redundant. Bankruptcy cases can only last for as long as the debtor has
assets left to distribute to its creditors. The creditors have an incentive not to
waste the bankruptcy estate’s time and money on frivolous litigation. Any
resources that go toward litigation become unavailable for creditors to collect,
and again, this is especially true of the zero-sum liquidation game. The
trustee’s or debtor in possession’s fiduciary duty toward the bankruptcy estate
prevents it from initiating litigation without any reasonable prospects of
enhancing and maintaining the estate’s value. A court should dismiss for
failure to state a claim only when exceptional circumstances give the court
good reason to believe that a particular case will bypass those safeguards.
The alternative to reading the deference principle into the Court’s dicta
would be to rigidly apply the Twombly-Iqbal standard even in cases that could
not possibly lead to the kind of unfairness that prompted the Court’s action in
those two cases. Angell v. BER Care, Inc. (In re Caremerica, Inc.),239 in which
the court relied on Twombly and Iqbal to dismiss an adversary complaint for
failure to state a claim, shows why the notice analysis is inappropriate for
bankruptcy cases. The Angell court reasoned that because Iqbal showed that
the Twombly rule applied beyond antitrust law,240 it should apply equally to
bankruptcy practice.241 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected preTwombly authority on pleading standards, even though that authority rested on
the same language from Conley that the Twombly Court had quoted
approvingly.242 The Angell court ignored the policy rationale of Twombly and
Iqbal, dismissing out of hand the complainant’s argument that the court should
not strictly apply the Twombly-Iqbal standard because it would not further
those cases’ policy goals.243 This decision recalls the Code pleading era,
ritualistically applying a pleading standard to accomplish nothing more than
prevent a potentially meritorious claim from moving forward.

239

409 B.R. 737, 746 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2009).
Id.
241 Id. at 748–50.
242 Compare id. at 748–49 (citing Brandywine Apartments v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
The IT Group (In re The IT Group, Inc.), 313 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (noting that the complaint
should provide “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”)), with Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
(same)).
243 Angell, 409 B.R. at 754.
240
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Courts should not follow the Angell decision and instead ought to consider
how to apply Twombly-Iqbal with the Court’s policy goals in mind. Although
bankruptcy perhaps provides the purest example of litigation in equilibrium,
courts should look to similar features of other types of cases to determine
whether they can relax Twombly-Iqbal’s pleading standards without subjecting
the defendant to undue harm. The presence of structural safeguards that
already protect defendants vitiates the risk of unfair burdens that led to the
Court’s Twombly-Iqbal jurisprudence.
2. Keeping Frivolous Cases Out
Having shown how the deference principle affords judges the flexibility to
implement Twombly-Iqbal as liberally as a fair reading of those cases allows,
this Comment turns to the question of when courts should apply TwomblyIqbal strictly. This Comment understands Twombly-Iqbal as a narrow solution
to a particular problem that Judge Clark had not anticipated in adapting the
Rules from David Dudley Field’s prototype. This narrow reading minimally
upsets established practice and avoids any unintended consequences that might
come from a needlessly labored interpretation of the Rules’ austere language,
which for the most part has endured the several decades since its enactment
without requiring any judicial renovations.
This Comment characterizes this problem as the phenomenon of the
“private prosecution.”
The practice of suing based on suspicion of
wrongdoing, without a further basis of information and belief, defines the
private prosecution. Private prosecutions tend to attack diffuse rather than
individualized wrongdoing. They accomplish this either directly through the
class-action process or indirectly against actors perceived to commit
widespread harms beyond the subject matter of the particular case. Traditional
common law litigation—a plaintiff suing in tort who seeks to be made whole
through a sum that represents the harm inflicted—rights wrongs by reversing
the wrongdoer–victim relationship into the plaintiff–defendant relationship.
Private prosecutions target defendants with concentrated economic or
political power to achieve the best “return” on the litigation resources plaintiffs
“invest.” This litigation lasts until the costs of pursuing it begin to eat into the
marginal returns. This makes liberal discovery lucrative because it places
burdens on defendants out of proportion to the effort plaintiffs exert to secure a
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return.244 A private prosecution need not reach the merits to serve this
purpose.245 The diffuse interests involved, along with both plaintiffs and
defendants being repeat players in litigation, add a public dimension to private
prosecutions.246 The contours of the liability these suits impose can guide
defendants’ subsequent behavior, acting as de facto regulation.247
Both Twombly and Iqbal involved private prosecutions. Although private
plaintiffs brought those cases, the Department of Justice could have chosen to
investigate the underlying allegations of misconduct.248 Unlike private
citizens, these agencies have broad investigatory powers and need not rely on
civil discovery to build their cases.249 In principle, these agencies can (and
arguably do) use those powers to harass and to burden parties like the
defendants in Twombly or Iqbal, but policy and political considerations can
discourage them from undertaking prosecutions manifestly not in the public
interest.
No such constraints limit opportunistic civil plaintiffs. Once an opportunist
gains access to the discovery process, liberal discovery obligates the target to
yield his privacy in much the same way as the target of a federal investigation.
In either case, failure to comply with discovery proceedings would put the
defendant in contempt of court. Without some kind of bulwark at the pleading
stage, anyone with the resources to finance a legal team could become a
private attorney general and pursue targets of opportunity for monetary or
political gain.
The deference principle curtails this kind of abuse by restricting would-be
private prosecutors to a limited institutional role. A plaintiff with enough
access to non-public information about a target defendant to provide adequate
notice could find himself in a better position to file suit and conduct an
investigation through discovery than the appropriate government agency. A
government agency might also uncover information that could form a basis for
private liability but elect not to sue, in which case a private prosecutor might

244 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”).
245 “[T]he principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits” comes
from no less an authority than Conley v. Gibson itself. 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
246 See supra Part II.B.
247 See supra Part II.B.
248 See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (granting United States attorneys power to prosecute antitrust violations); 18
U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (defining deprivation of civil rights under color of law as a felony).
249 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2006) (enumerating administrative agencies’ investigatory powers).
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use the Freedom of Information Act250 to learn enough to litigate the matter
himself.
Private prosecutions call for the most exacting application of the TwomblyIqbal standard. Courts should always remember that private prosecutions yield
broad enforcement and regulatory powers to citizens acting on behalf of
personal or special interests. The statutes giving individuals powers concurrent
to those of the government contain protective elements to prevent their abuse,
but as in Iqbal and Twombly,251 plaintiffs may try to exploit low pleading
standards when access to discovery is valuable enough in itself to encourage
frivolous lawsuits. Defending the pretrial litigation process from attempts by
plaintiffs to co-opt it promotes the long-term viability of its other liberal
features, such as broad discovery.
As a matter of probability, Twombly-Iqbal dismissal will in some cases
prevent discovery that would have revealed wrongdoing, even though the
complaint could not articulate any reason to expect it. Nonetheless, such cases
are not “meritorious” in any meaningful sense, because for the purposes of
pleading “merit” means merit at the outset rather than at judgment. The
meritorious cases distinguish themselves from the frivolous on the basis of
their prospective worth in competing for the judiciary’s limited resources. The
fact that a stopped clock is right twice a day should not stop us from fixing it.
Characterizing litigation in this manner—strictly on the basis of its final
outcome—would also mean classifying the losing side’s case as retrospectively
frivolous. It would ignore the purpose of the civil justice system: to resolve
disputes civilly regardless of outcome. The Rules accomplish this when a
plaintiff earns his day in court by stating a claim that would entitle him to
relief.
Moreover, a fair reading of the Federal Rules precludes the practice of
pleading on suspicion rather than genuine information or belief. Recall Rule
11’s requirement that the pleader before the court must certify that “the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”252
Contentions in complaints with notice gaps ipso facto lack “evidentiary
support.” A litigant certifying the complaint must then have some objective
reason to believe that they “will likely have evidentiary support.” If so, the
250
251
252

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
See supra Part II.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).

MOLINE GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

10/22/2010 12:48 PM

NINETEENTH-CENTURY PRINCIPLES

207

plaintiff can put that reason into the complaint to bridge the notice gap.
Otherwise, he would defraud the court by certifying the allegations. Even
under the assumption that private prosecutions of unsubstantiated claims serve
some public interest to justify relaxing Rule 8, a plaintiff cannot bring such a
claim without making a false certification to the court. This characteristic of
private prosecutions further distinguishes them from most other civil actions
under the Rules. Perhaps a new Rule built around the conscious goal of
maximizing their systemic benefits and minimizing their systemic costs would
better handle this sort of litigation than a method that attempts to work private
prosecution into a Rule designed with a different class of cases in mind.
Consider that the failure of Twombly-Iqbal to curb discovery abuse would
necessitate further reforms, whose collateral effects on meritorious claims
could prove far costlier.
CONCLUSION
This Comment represents a project of reconciliations. Twombly and Iqbal
seem to their critics an abrupt step back to a less rational past. A more
thorough study of the history, though, shows that the reformers on the Supreme
Court sought the same goals as the drafters of the Federal Rules. They in turn
were continuing the project begun in the nineteenth century by David Dudley
Field, the great legal reformer of his era. Though the particularities of its
implementation have changed in the intervening decades, the ethic that Field
laid down has persevered. This Comment merely adapts that ethic into
principles that address the problems of contemporary pleading.
The concept of the notice gap focuses courts on the complaint’s role, as
understood prior to Conley. The plaintiff must tell the defendant and the court
the story of his case. This requires enough factual detail so that all involved
can understand who committed the wrong and what, where, when, and how it
occurred. Any complaint that tells this story, without any gaps, provides fair
notice to the defendant and allows the plaintiff to proceed to discovery. Courts
should consider dismissing a complaint only when it fails to provide notice and
would subject the defendant to the kind of abusive discovery that the Twombly
and Iqbal defendants faced.
Adding the deference principle as an equitable rule of reason to the bare
notice analysis reclaims some of the benefits of the overbroad Conley doctrine.
This Comment understands Twombly as mandating a change in priorities, not
necessarily an abandonment of the concerns that animated the Conley Court.
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Once a judge ensures in a particular case that the abuses that Twombly-Iqbal
sought to prevent are absent, he should then apply the permissive version of
the Conley standard to the extent compatible with Twombly-Iqbal and
consistent with procedural fairness. Using these two doctrines in concert
directs the court toward the exercise of its gate-keeping powers for the benefit
of either party, as justice requires.
Developing a pleading rule means, ultimately, reconciling the wronged
plaintiff’s desire for the courts to redress his injury against the innocent
defendant’s desire for the courts to let him alone. As the continuous invention
of new rights insinuates the courts into more and more formerly private
disputes, consider whether we should not welcome a small step in the opposite
direction.
This Comment stands on the shoulders of civil procedure’s giants: David
Dudley Field in the nineteenth century and Judge Clark in the twentieth. They
foresaw most of the same problems with pleading that the profession now
faces today. This Comment only begins the process of updating the full scope
of their ideas into today’s pleading doctrine.
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